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Medical Screening and Employment Law:

A Note of Caution and Some Observations
Mark A. Rothsteint
Medical screening of workers, the use of medical criteria in the
selection and maintenance of a work force, has become an established practice in many industries. Medical screening is not new.
Since the turn of the century large industrial companies have employed "factory surgeons" to determine whether applicants and
employees were free of disease and had the necessary strength,
stamina, vision, hearing, and other physical attributes to perform
the job.
In recent years medical screening has changed both qualitatively and quantitatively. The purpose of screening no longer is
simply to decide whether an individual is currently capable of performing the job. Increasingly, "predictive screening" attempts to
identify whether currently capable individuals are at risk of developing a medical impairment at some future time. This newer form
of medical screening is greatly affected by technological advancements and is likely to become an increasingly important part of the
employee selection process.
Each year American companies require their employees to
submit to millions of blood tests, urine tests, x-rays, pulmonary
function tests, and other medical and laboratory procedures. Why?
How essential are these tests? How valuable and accurate is the
information they yield? How does the law attempt to regulate
medical screening? What policy questions are raised by medical
screening?
The burgeoning use of these procedures might suggest that
medical screening of workers has been carefully considered, is accurate and effective, and results in net benefits to labor, management, and public health. Unfortunately, this is often not the case.
Medical screening is often the inappropriate, simple, "high tech"
answer to a wide range of complicated problems. Employers often
implement workplace medical screening procedures without a thort Professor of Law and Director of the Health Law Institute at the University of Houston. A more detailed discussion of many of the issues in this article is contained in the
author's forthcoming book, Medical Screening and Employee Health Costs.
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ough consideration of the consequences. The test results are frequently inaccurate and, even if they were accurate, the use of the
tests may still be counterproductive to the interests of labor, management, public health, and public policy.
This Article attempts to discuss the efficacy and social impact
of medical screening at a time when its virtues have been widely
extolled and when new scientific advances threaten to change fundamentally established tenets of employment relations. The Article necessarily focuses on broad questions involving the future direction of employment law in an age of technological and economic
change. Because of the wide array of issues raised in the Article, it
is impossible to provide a detailed analysis of each issue. Some of
these matters already have been addressed elsewhere by other authors and me.1 The remaining issues may well be worthy subjects
for future research. By using a "wide angle lens" approach, this
Article seeks to put medical screening in perspective and to make
some meaningful observations about the landscape of employment
law.
I.

THE GROWING PRESSURES TO ENGAGE IN MEDICAL SCREENING

A. The Increase in Medical Screening
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), a part of the Department of Health and Human Services, has conducted the most extensive studies on the frequency
of medical screening in industry. A comparison of data from its
1972-1974 study with data from the 1981-1983 follow-up study indicates that medical screening has substantially increased in just a
nine-year period.
Table 1 shows increases in both preplacement and periodic
See, for example, Mark A. Rothstein, Medical Screening of Workers (1984); Ashford,
Medical Screening in the Workplace: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 1 Seminars in Occup. Med. 67 (1986); Thomas D. McGarity and Elinor P. Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment'Screening, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 999 (1981); Benjamin W. Mintz, Medical Surveillance of
Employees Under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 28 J. of Occup. Med.
913 (1986); Mark A. Rothstein, Discriminatory Aspects of Medical Screening, 28 J. of Occup. Med. 924 (1986); Mark A. Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to
Employment Relations and Employment Law, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 683 (1987); Mark A.
Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Illness, 81 Mich. L.

Rev. 1379 (1983); Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Issues in the Medical Assessment of Physical
Impairments by Third-Party Physicians, 5 J. Legal Med. 503 (1984); Mark A Rothstein,
Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 940 (1987); Mark A. Rothstein, Screening Workers for AIDS, in Harlon L. Dalton &
Scott Barris, eds., AIDS and the Law 126 (1987).

MEDICAL SCREENING
examinations.2

TABLE 1
Estimated percentage of Workers With Screening Examinations
Type of Examination

Estimated % of Workers
1972-1974
1981-1983

Preplacement
Periodic

47.7
33.7

58.8
40.2

Source: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) National Occupational Hazard Survey 1972-1974; NIOSH National Occupational Exposure Survey 1981-1983 (preliminary data).
According to Table 2, medical screening continues to be much
more common in large plants, but the largest percentage increase'
has been in preplacement examinations in small plants.3
TABLE 2
Estimated Percentage of Workers With Screening Examinations by Size of Plant

Estimated % of Workers
Type of Examination

Preplacement
Periodic

Small Plants
(<100 Workers)

Medium Plants
(100-499 Workers)

Large Plants
(>500 Workers)

1972-1974

1981-1983

1972-1974

1981-1983

1972-1974

1981-1983

19.2
12.2

26.6
13.4

48.9
29.3

56.4
38.1

83.3
65.4

87.8
68.8

Source: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) National Occupational Hazard Survey 1972-1974; NIOSH National Occupational Exposure Survey 1981-1983
(preliminary data).

Table 3 shows that, by percentage, blood and urine testing in4
creased more than other kinds of tests.

2

Jennifer M. Ratcliffe, William E. Halperin, Todd M. Frazier, et al., The Prevalence of

Screening in Industry: Report from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health National Occupational Hazard Survey, 28 J. Occup. Med. 906, 907 (1986).
3 Id. at 908.
4 Id.

4

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1988:

TABLE 3
Estimated Percentage of Workers With Specific Periodic Examinations
Estimated % of Workers
Test
Chest radiograph
Opthalmologic
Audiometric
Blood
Urine
Pulmonary function
Allergies
Immunizations

1972-1974

1981-1983

25.0
22.3
21.4
14.7
14.4
13.5

33.0
31.4
40.2
36.0
34.9
28.9
7.4
19.0

*

24.2

* Information

not recorded.
Source: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
National Occupational Hazard Survey 1972-1974; NIOSH National Occupational Exposure Survey 1981-1983 (preliminary data).
Table 4 indicates that the largest increases were in the services
and wholesale/retail trade sectors.

MEDICAL SCREENING
TABLE 4
Estimated Percentage of Workers With Screening Examinations by Industry Type
Estimated % of Workers
Industry Sector

Preplacement
1972-1974

Blood (Periodic)

1981-1983 1972-1974

Chest Radiograph
(Periodic)

1981-1983 1972-1974 1981-1983

Transportation/public
utilities

81.6

72.7

12.2

32.6

32.7

28.5

Manufacturing

67.0

61.8

24.1

35.0

35.9

33.6

Services

40.9

69.0

13.7

59.5

30.5

53.7

Wholesale/retail trade

22.0

34.6

5.9

17.3

13.9

13.0

Finance/insurance

33.2

*

1.0

*

7.3

*

8.0

12.0

11.0

9.3

4.0

8.3

Contract construction
*Not surveyed.

Source: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) National Occupational Hazard Survey 1972-1974; NIOSH National Occupational Exposure Survey 1981-1983
(preliminary data).

Other forms of medical screening, not specifically covered by
the NIOSH studies, also have become much more common. For
example, among Fortune 500 corporations, only ten percent performed drug testing in 1982;' by 1985 the figure had reached
twenty-five percent;' and by 1987 nearly fifty percent of the largest
corporations performed drug testing.'
B.

What is Causing the Increase?

The increase in medical screening may be attributable to a
number of factors. For employees exposed to toxic substances such
as asbestos, lead, and ethylene oxide, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) standards require preplacement
and periodic medical examinations. This would account for increases in periodic pulmonary function tests, for example. Second,
employees working under a collective bargaining agreement also
may be subject to periodic medical examinations pursuant to a
safety and health provision in the agreement. Approximately one6 Fern Schumer Chapman, The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, Fortune 57, 58 (Aug. 19,
1985).
7

Id.

8 Peter Boyer, ABC to Start Drug Tests, N.Y. Times sec. C, 36 (July 10, 1987); Labor
Letter: Drug Tests Spread, Wall St. J. 1 (April 7, 1987).
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third of all union contracts contain a provision relating to medical
examinations.'
These two factors may explain the increased medical screening
by large employers (which are more likely to be unionized), in certain industries (e.g., where there is exposure to toxic substances),
and in the use of certain procedures (e.g., chest x-rays and pulmonary function tests). Nevertheless, Tables 1 through 4 demonstrate
that the largest percentage increases occurred in categories less
likely to be affected by OSHA requirements or collective bargaining: Preplacement examinations in small plants, blood and urine
tests, and testing in the service sector. The reasons behind these
increases offer the best evidence of the future direction of medical
screening.
It has become increasingly clear that the newer forms of medical screening are not concerned with workplace hazards so much as
employee health in general. Simply stated, medical procedures
have been instituted as a cost-containment measure. A healthy
work force means lower workers' compensation costs, reduced absenteeism, less turnover, lower disability and health insurance
costs, reduced tort liability (such as asbestos products liability
suits), and higher productivity. Of course some medical screening
is performed because of altruistic concerns with having a safe and
healthy work force.
The growing pressures to engage in medical screening also can
be traced to four general trends: Medical advances, economic pressures, political pressures, and social pressures.
Medical Advances. Some increases in medical screening can be
traced directly to new medical technologies. For example, the development of new immunoassay 10 techniques facilitated widespread drug testing, by providing a method of fast, cheap, and simple urinalysis. The AIDS epidemic and subsequent discovery of a
procedure to test for antibodies to ,the virus created a new form of
medical testing. In the long term, however, the medical develop9 Bureau

of National Affairs, Inc., 2 Collective Bargaining 95:2 (1988).

o An immunoassay is a test using immunological principles of antigen-antibody reac-

tions to detect the presence and amount of a tested-for substance. This technique is used in,
among other things, AIDS and drug testing. In an immunoassay drug test, for example, a
known quantity of the tested-for drug is bound to an enzyme or radioactive iodine and is
added to a urine specimen. If the urine contains the drug, the added, "labeled" drug competes with the drug in the specimen and cannot bind to the antibodies. As a result, the
enzyme or radioactive iodine remains active. By measuring enzyme activity or radioactivity,
the presence and amount of the drug can be determined. See Council on Scientific Affairs,
American Medical Association, Scientific Issues in Drug Testing, 257 J. A.M.A. 3110, 311213 (1987).

MEDICAL SCREENING
ment with the greatest potential for worker screening is genetic
screening.
Genetic screening of workers in the United States has been
advocated by some individuals since 1963, when research suggested
that certain inborn errors of metabolism and biochemical genetic
conditions would predispose individuals to illness when working in
a particular work environment. 1 These suggestions were not followed by most companies and were ignored by the public until
1980 when a series of articles in the New York Times indicated
that DuPont had been performing sickle cell testing and that Dow
Chemical and Johnson & Johnson had engaged in cytogenetic
monitoring 2 of workers. In rapid succession there were Congressional hearings on genetic testing, a survey of genetic testing in
industry, and a report of the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) which recommended against both genetic screening and genetic monitoring.' 3
The adverse publicity surrounding genetic testing led most observers to conclude that genetic testing, to the extent it was being
done in the first place, had essentially stopped by the mid-1980s. It
is important to note that this initial phase of genetic testing was
concerned with genetic predisposition and genetic changes related
to occupational diseases." Although this type of genetic testing
raised a host of important issues, it had the potential to affect only
the limited part of the work force with specific toxic exposures.
The next phase of genetic testing almost certainly will involve diseases that are not occupationally related.
Developments in genetics are occurring at an extremely rapid
pace. New genetic markers for disease and new genetic technologies are being discovered seemingly on a daily basis. It is likely
that within five to ten years scientists will have refined genetic

" Herbert E. Stokinger and John T. Mountain, Tests for Hypersusceptibility to Hemolytic Chemicals, 6 Archives of Envtl. Health 495 (1963).
12 dytogenetic monitoring refers to the periodic testing of workers to assess whether
there has been chromosomal damage as a result of exposure to hazardous substances or
agents. Genetic changes are believed to be the cellular precursors of diseases such as cancer.
See Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, The Role of Genetic
Testing in the Prevention of Occupational Disease 52 (1983).
" Id. at 9.
" For example, testing to detect sickle cell trait (the normally benign heterozygous
state) has been advocated based on the theory that individuals with sickle cell trait may
suffer from a serious illness, such as a hemolytic crisis, by working in environments capable
of causing deficient oxygenation of the blood (such as in aircraft or mine rescue work) or
where there is exposure to hemolytic agents such as benzene, lead, and carbon monoxide.
See Rothstein, Medical Screening of Workers at 54-55 (cited in note 1).
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tests for a wide range of genetic conditions and traits, including
Huntington's disease, polycystic kidney disease, cystic fibrosis,
Duchenne muscular dystrophy, heart disease, and various cancers.
Preliminary tests already have been developed for some of these
diseases. As discussed in the following section, employers would
have substantial economic incentives to use genetic tests.
Economic Pressures. One role served by medical screening is
keeping costly, high-risk workers out of the work force. It is beyond dispute that unhealthy workers represent a substantial burden to employers. The largest increased cost is health insurance.
According to a recent study, ninety-seven percent of medium and
large companies offer health insurance as an employee benefit."5
Employee health benefits costs increased from 8.9 percent in 1986
to 9.7 percent of total payroll costs in 1987-about $1985 per employee.16 Both self-insured companies and experience-rated, privately-insured companies will have significantly higher health care
expenses with an unhealthy work force.
The effects of economic pressures on employee medical screening practices already can be seen with cigarette smoking. In the
last five years a small but growing number of companies have
adopted policies of refusing to hire cigarette smokers, even those
who do not smoke at work.17 The main reason for these policies is
the rising cost of health insurance for smokers. By one estimate, in
1980 health care cost savings per nonsmoking employee ranged
from $75-$150 annually. 8 Today, total costs of smoking, including
productivity losses, have been estimated at $1000 per worker. 9
Another significant economic impetus for screening is the sales
pressure of manufacturers, laboratories, and consultants who deal
in medical screening products and services. For example, workplace drug testing is more than a $1 billion per year business.2 0
Aggressive marketing and sales forces often overstate the value of
medical screening and paint a bleak picture of the consequences of
failing to use the product or service being offered.2 '
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Employee Benefits 1966 (1988).
"

A. Foster Higgins & Co., Foster Higgins Health Care Benefits Survey 1987 (1988).

17 See Rothstein, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 940 (cited in note 1).

"8 Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Where There's Smoke: Problems and Policies Concerning Smoking in the Workplace 11 (2d ed. 1987) (citing estimates by Dr. Marvin
Kristein).
" Id.
"0$100 million per year estimate in 1985. Chapman, Fortune at 62 (cited in note 6).
Testing for Drug Use: Handle with Care, Business Week 65 (March 28, 1988).
" For instance, one common sales technique is for a sales representative to approach
Company A and say: "I just sold a complete drug testing package to your chief competitor,

MEDICAL SCREENING

Political Pressures. Some decisions to implement medical
screening programs have little to do with sound medical or business judgments. They are the result of political pressure. For public employers, the testing may be mandated by the government.
For private employers, the pressure is indirect, through exhortations by public officials and media attention.
The history of drug testing by employers provides the best example of political pressure causing increases in medical screening.
From 1982 to 1987 the percentage of Fortune 500 companies performing drug testing increased from less than ten percent to about
fifty percent. During this same time period the rate of drug use in
the United States actually declined.2 The impetus for federal sector drug testing was the report of the President's Commission on
Organized Crime, which advocated drug testing by public and private employers in an effort to reduce the demand for illegal
drugs." This recommendation led to the issuance of an Executive
Order in 1986,2 mandating drug testing for about 1.1 million federal civilian employees.25 Although safety, productivity, national
security, and other reasons are often used to justify the program, it
is clear that the main reason is law enforcement. No testing is performed for alcohol, prescription drugs, or over-the-counter medications which, because of their more widespread abuse, represent a
much greater threat to public safety than illicit drugs.2
Drug testing in the private sector became more widespread after receiving the imprimatur of the federal government. With a
media-conscious "war on drugs," some companies initiated drug
testing because the failure to do so might be perceived as condoning drug use. This sentiment was aptly expressed by President
Reagan: "I have heard critics say employers have no business looking for drug abuse in the workplace, but when you pin the critics
down, too often they seem to be among the handful who still be-

Company B. If you don't also buy the complete package, Company B will have a 'clean'
work force and you will be left with all of the junkies."
" See Annual NIDA Report Says Decline in Use of Cocaine is "Significant," 2 Nat'l
Rep. on Substance Abuse 1, 8 (Jan. 20, 1988).
" President's Commission on Organized Crime, America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug
Trafficking, and Organized Crime 483 (1986).
11 Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed.Reg. 32.889 (1986).
" See Bernard Weinraub, Administration Aides Back Tests of Federal Employees for
Drugs, N.Y. Times sec. A, 1 (Sept. 11, 1986).
" See Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, Department of Health
and Human Services, Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs, 52 Fed. Reg. 30.638 (1987).
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lieve that drug abuse is a victimless crime. ' 7 Although this statement reflects more politics than reality, it contains an unmistakable, and, to some, persuasive message advocating drug testing.
Moreover, drug testing is an appealing, simple, technological answer to the difficult and significant problem of workplace drug
abuse.
Social Pressures. To some extent, the political pressure to engage in employee drug testing is social pressure as well.28 It is the
workplace part of a social problem and a socially-driven response.
An even more compelling example of medical screening caused by
social pressure is AIDS testing. Management, employees, customers, and the public all have had a part in contributing to the pressure to engage in AIDS testing or, more precisely, testing for antibodies to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
AIDS continues to be a terrifying disease. Its origin, current
dimensions, and future spread are uncertain. There is no treatment or cure and it is invariably fatal. The stigma attached to the
disease also is caused in large measure by the unpopularity of homosexual men and intravenous drug users, the two most heavily
afflicted groups.
AIDS has not only spawned fear in the public, but it also has
led to a deep sense of frustration. After over five years of intensive
research, no effective vaccine or treatment has been developed and
none appears likely in the near term. The only major scientific
breakthrough occurred in 1985 when the Food and Drug Administration approved the first tests to detect antibodies to HIV.29 The
test was designed for and has been very effective in screening the
nation's blood supply. With only one tool available, however, and
public sentiment to "do something" about AIDS, it was inevitable
that there would be calls for widespread testing of individuals,
such as in the military, schools, prisons, for insurance, and in
employment.
Despite unanimity among experts that AIDS cannot be spread
by casual contact, advocates of HIV testing in the workplace assert
that it is necessary to test (and exclude those testing HIV positive)
in order to: (1) Protect coworkers, customers and the public from
Bureau of National Affairs, Workplace Next Battleground in Drug Crusade, Reagan
Tells Meeting, 6 Empl. Rel. Weekly 205 (1988) (reporting speech at Duke University on
Feb. 8, 1988).
28 Economic pressures, political pressures, and social pressures may overlap in varying
degrees. The key characteristic of social pressure is that it grows from the "bottom up," on
the hopes, fears, and interests of employees, customers, and other members of the public.
29 For further discussion, see Rothstein, AIDS and the Law 126 (cited in note 1).
2
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infection; (2) protect the health of the infected worker; and (3)
promote productivity and efficiency by appeasing coworkers and
customers, reducing absenteeism, turnover, and sick leave, and
limiting health care costs. Only the third reason is based on fact
and serves as a legitimate purpose,3 0 though coworker or customer
preference and increased cost arguments are unlikely to justify discrimination in apparent violation of state and local AIDS laws and
state and federal handicap discrimination laws." Nevertheless, the
social pressure continues. In a 1987 poll, forty-two percent of the
respondents said that all new employees should be tested.2
C. Limitations on the Usefulness of Medical Screening
Many diagnostic and predictive medical tests are not nearly as
accurate as is popularly believed. Most physicians recognize the
limitations of tests and therefore would be extremely reluctant to
make a diagnosis on the basis, for example, of a single blood or
urine test without a complete history and physical examination.
Some medical tests used in the workplace setting, however, despite
their low predictive value, may single-handedly disqualify an individual from employment.33
It is also important to understand what a test measures and
what it does not measure. AIDS tests do not measure AIDS. They
'o Id. at 140. See also Centers for Disease Control, Guidelines on AIDS in the Workplace, in Public Health Service, 34 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep. 682 (Nov. 15, 1985).
See Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS in the Workplace, in Halon L. Dalton & Scott Burris,
eds., AIDS and the Law 109 (1987).
" Debate Rages Over AIDS-Test Policy, Wall St. J. 33 (June 18, 1987) (based on a
Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll).
" Each year an estimated one million preemployment low-back x-rays are given by
employers in mining, construction, railroad, and other industries in an attempt to screen out
asymptomatic workers who are believed to be at risk of a back injury from strenuous work.
Genetic Screening and the Handling of High-Risk Groups in the Work Place, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (Oct. 15, 1981) (statement of Dr. Paul
Rockey, U.S. Public Health Services). Despite such widespread use, the low-back x-ray has
been discredited in the scientific literature as a basis for employment screening. See, for
example, E. S. Gibson, The Value of Preplacement Screening Radiography of the Low Back,
3 Occup. Med.-State of the Art Rev. No. 1, 91 (1988). The test screens out too many people
who are healthy and will never suffer from back injury while failing to detect those
presymptomatic persons who are actually at risk. According to one study, of those individuals screened out on the basis of a positive low-back x-ray, twenty-one percent will never
have low-back pain, sixty percent will not lose time from work because of back problems,
and ninety-eight percent will never require back surgery. Paul H. Rockey, Jane Fantel, &
Gilbert S. Omenn, Discriminatory Aspects of Pre-Employment Screening, 5 Am. J. L. &
Med. 197 (1980). For a more detailed discussion of biostatistical principles in medical
screening, see Rothstein, Medical Screening of workers at 45-50 (cited in note 1).
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detect the nonneutralizing antibodies to HIV infection which develop from four weeks to one year after exposure to the virus.34
Drug tests do not measure impairment or intoxication. They measure inert metabolites of the tested-for substance being excreted in
the urine. Drug tests cannot determine whether the individual is
currently intoxicated, or was ever intoxicated by the substance;
how long before testing the individual was exposed to the substance; or the amount of the substance consumed by the
individual."
Finally, in analyzing the desirability and relative merits of any
medical screening procedure, managers also need to realize that
each new test required of workers carries with it some employee
relations cost. This is particularly true if the test procedure is intrusive, invasive, embarrassing, or otherwise unpopular with employees. Once an air of suspicion, distrust, and animosity pervades
the labor-management relationship, there may be a number of unpleasant consequences, such as difficulties in recruiting new employees; lower productivity; increases in turnover, absenteeism,
theft, sabotage, and disciplinary problems; and, for many companies, the ultimate nightmare-unionization.
II.

LAWS AFFECTING MEDICAL SCREENING

A. Laws Regulating Working Conditions
If the primary purpose of medical screening is to safeguard
employee health, the first law to consider is the Occupational
Safety and Health Act." The Act covers all private employment in
the United States, an estimated five million workplaces and seventy-five million employees. 37 The purpose of the Act is "to assure
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions." 88 The Occupational Safety and
See Rothstein, Aids and the Law at 129-31 (cited in note 1).
See Rothstein, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 691-99 (cited in note 1). Perhaps the most
misleading "medical" test in use in the workplace is the polygraph or "lie detector", test.
Polygraphs do not detect lies. They measure abdominal and thoracic respiration, blood pressure and pulse, galvanic skin response, and muscle contractions. From these measurements
the examiner attempts to deduce whether the subject has given truthful answers to specific
questions based on the unproven assumption that certain physiological reactions correlate
with untruthful answers to questions. See generally Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing (1983).
" 29 U.S.C. sec. 651-78 (1982).
37 For a discussion of OSHA jurisdiction, see Mark A. Rothstein, Occupational Safety
and Health Law 11-21 (2d ed. 1983).
1829 U.S.C. sec. 651(b).
'

"

MEDICAL SCREENING
Health Administration (OSHA), the agency within the Department
of Labor charged with enforcing the Act, is responsible for promulgating mandatory safety and health standards and ensuring employer compliance by conducting on-site inspections, issuing citations and abatement orders, and assessing civil penalties.
Medical examination of workers is an important part of occupational health surveillance. OSHA's medical examination requirements, however, are hazard-specific; examinations are only mandated when employees are exposed to substances such as lead,
cotton dust, and coke oven emmissions. OSHA has not promulgated a generic medical examination regulation with universal applicability. Moreover, even where medical tests are mandated, employers generally must merely perform certain tests. Thus, the
standards are notable in what they do not provide: (1) They do not
prohibit the use of any additional medical tests; (2) they contain
little guidance to medical personnel about how to interpret test results; and (3) with only a few exceptions, they do not indicate what
employment actions may be taken as a result of medical tests.
It is unrealistic to expect OSHA to regulate medical screening.
To begin with, the employment effects of medical screening may
be beyond OSHA's jurisdiction. OSHA's mandate is limited to regulating working conditions by eliminating or reducing hazards. As
the Supreme Court has noted, "the Act in no way authorizes
OSHA to repair general unfairness that is unrelated to achievement of health and safety goals." 9 In addition, OSHA lacks the
necessary resources and political resolve. Between 1971 and December 1984, OSHA promulgated only eleven new permanent
health standards, covering twenty-four specific chemical substances. Its remaining health standards, covering approximately
400 substances, are based on 1968 scientific data, and thousands of
chemicals commonly used in industry are not regulated at all. ° It
took fifteen years of litigation and a court order before OSHA
promulgated a standard requiring drinking water, hand washing
facilities, and toilets for the nation's farmworkers."' OSHA is unable to deal effectively with traditional workplace hazards and,
therefore, at this time, cannot be expected to confront such com19American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981).
'0See Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace 13 (1985).
" See Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1987), order
vacated 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987), because the standards had been issued.
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plex issues as cigarette smoking, drug testing, genetic testing, and
2
AIDS.'
B.

Laws Regulating Benefits

Laws regulating compensation and health benefits for sick and
injured workers have had the effect of encouraging employers to
engage in increasingly extensive preemployment medical screening.
For example, workers' compensation laws, primarily state laws,
provide medical and disability benefits to employees who suffer a
work-related injury or illness regardless of the fault of any party.
Although workers' compensation systems vary, an increase in
claims will result in increased expenses for the claimants' employers. Under workers' compensation laws the general rule is that a
claimant will not be denied compensation because of a preexisting
allergy, weakness, disease, or susceptibility.' Because employers
take employees "as is," the fear of increased compensation payments or insurance rates encourages employers to be very selective
in hiring.
A similar incentive for medical screening exists under unemployment insurance laws, which provide income replacement to
workers who have lost their jobs. Employees who are discharged
for misconduct and employees who quit are ineligible for benefits.
The majority rule is that employees who quit work because of jobrelated health problems are entitled to unemployment compensation, even if the employees are particularly sensitive to the workplace environment."" Therefore, an employer that did not administer preemployment allergy tests, for example, and hired an
employee who was allergic to a substance in the workplace would
be responsible for unemployment insurance benefits when the employee was forced to quit.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)"'
42

OSHA has taken some limited action on AIDS. On July 23, 1987, OSHA denied a

petition filed by health care unions for an emergency standard to reduce exposure to HIV.
OSHA indicated that it was in the process of developing a permanent standard on AIDS
and, in the interim, would cite employers under the Act's general duty clause, 29 U.S.C.
sec. 654(a)(1) (1982), for failing to comply with infection control measures of the Centers for
Disease Control. On October 30, 1987, the departments of Labor and Health and Human
Services published joint guidelines for protecting health care workers exposed to AIDS and
hepatitis B viruses. 52 Fed. Reg. 41,818 (1987).
43 Arthur Larson, 1B The Law of Workmen's Compensation Law sec. 41.62 & 41.63
at
7-446 & 7-465 (1987).
" See, for example, Alexander v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 104 Cal. App.3d 97,
163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980); Ellis v. Iowa Dep't of Job Service, 285 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1979).
" 29 U.S.C. sec. 1001-461 (1982).
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also may encourage preemployment medical screening. Section 510
of ERISA, applicable to employees but not applicants, prohibits
the discharge of an employee in order to deprive the employee of
benefits under an employee benefit plan."" The term "benefits" includes health insurance.4 7 In addition, according to an amendment
in 1986, ' 8 an employee who is discharged for any reason except
gross misconduct must be permitted to continue in the employer's
group health plan for up to eighteen months. Although the former
employee may be required to pay for coverage, the premiums may
not be more than two percent above the premiums paid by current
employees and the coverage offered must be the same.
Because of these two provisions of ERISA, employers are, in
effect, "stuck" with unhealthy employees once they are hired.
Thus, employers have an incentive to identify individuals who are
predisposed to illness and to refuse to hire them in the first place.
C.

Laws Prohibiting Discrimination

The principal legal protection for applicants and employees
against unreasonable medical screening by employers is federal
and state handicap discrimination law. At the federal level, the Rehabilitation Act 4 9 prohibits discrimination in employment against
a qualified individual with handicaps by the federal government
(Section 501), 50 contractors dealing with the federal government
(Section 503), 1 and recipients of federal financial assistance (Section 504). 85 The term "individual with handicaps" is broadly defined in the Rehabilitation Act as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such a person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."53
Although a private right of action exists under Sections 501 and
504, the exclusive responsibility for enforcing Section 503 is vested
in the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs in the De"6 29 U.S.C. sec. 1140 (1982).

"7See Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 (W.D. Mo. 1984). See generally
Vogel, Containing Medical and Disability Costs by Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1024 (1987).
48 29 U.S.C. sec. 1161-68 (West 1987).
'9 29 U.S.C. sec. 701-96 (1982 & West 1985).
50Id. at sec. 791.
51 Id. at sec. 793.
11 Id. at sec. 794.
" Id. at sec. 706(8)(B).
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partment of Labor."
State handicap discrimination laws generally apply to all public and private employers in the state (many states exempt small
employers) and often provide for a private right of action. Thus,
state laws are extremely important in redressing claims of discrimination in employment based on handicap. Mississippi and Alabama have laws applicable only to public employment; the rest of
the states and the District of Columbia have laws applicable in
both the public and private sectors.
Handicap discrimination laws are relatively easy to apply
when the alleged discrimination is based on a person's current
physical condition. The issue is whether the person, with reasonable accommodation, is able to perform the essential requirements
of the job safely and efficiently.'5 In ruling on these cases, the
courts are inclined to give employers greater latitude when coworker and public safety are involved rather than simply the
safety and health of the employee."
The law is much more difficult to apply to medical screening
when presently healthy persons are screened out because the employer believes that the persons have an increased risk of future
illness. Three of the most important questions to be resolved are
the following: (1) Does a person considered to be at increased risk
of illness come under the definition of "handicapped"; (2) if so, to
what extent may future risk be considered by the employer; and
(3) what defenses are available to the employer.
The Supreme Court addressed the first question in School Bd.
of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline,7 adopting a broad definition of
handicap. The Court held that an elementary school teacher afflicted with recurring tuberculosis was a "handicapped individual"
and therefore was covered under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. Mere fears of contagion would not justify discrimination by

" See generally Laura F. Rothstein, Rights of Physically Handicapped Persons
sec. 3.18, 4.04, 4.08 (1984).
" The range of required reasonable accommodations depends on, among other things,
the size of the employer, type of operation, composition of the work force, and cost. Nelson
v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 379 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Reasonable accommodation is not
required if doing so would result in undue hardship to the employer. For example, an employer will not be required to rewrite job descriptions to accommodate a single employee.
Bento v. I.T.O. Corp of Rhode Island, 599 F. Supp. 731, 745 (D.R.I. 1984).
10 See, for example, National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Com., etc., 452 A.2d 301 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982) (no liability for denying a railroad trackman position to an individual

with a glass eye).
5

107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
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the school board.58 The case was remanded, however, for a specific
determination of whether the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified,"
including the nature, duration, and severity of the risk she created
to third parties. Although Arline is the leading case on the coverage of handicap discrimination laws, it did not directly address the
issue of whether an increased risk of future illness is a handicap.
Most lower federal court and state court cases, however, have held
that future risk of illness is a handicap. 9
As to the second question, there are a variety of factors that
must be considered in deciding whether a future risk will justify
the refusal to employ a currently capable individual. The court
should consider, among other factors, the severity of the risk, relative e° and absolute6 risk, the likelihood of the risk eventuating, the
latency period between exposure and illness, and the reversibility
62

of the condition.

Finally, the two defenses to medical screening most likely to
be raised by employers are safety and cost. Where the safety of
coworkers or the public is involved the courts have given employers greater leeway in fashioning selection criteria.63 Cost has been
rejected in the few cases in which it has been raised, but in those
cases the amounts were small and the likelihood of expenditures
speculative. 6 It is not clear that the defense will not be given more
serious consideration in the case of AIDS or genetic disease where
the likelihood and amount of expenditures are substantial.
In addition to handicap discrimination laws, other anti-discrimination statutes may be relevant to medical screening. Specific
laws have been enacted dealing with AIDS testing, drug testing,
and genetic testing and more state and local legislation is likely. It
is not clear, however, that even these new laws will be effective in
" Id. at 1129-30.
See, for example, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980);
Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Com., 121 Cal. App.3d 791, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 548 (1981).
"0 Relative risk is "the ratio of the incidence rate for persons exposed to a factor to the
incidence rate for those not exposed." J. Mausner and S. Kramer, Mausner and Braun Epidemiology 169 (2d ed. 1985).
" Absolute risk refers to the incidence rate for an unexposed cohort. See Rothstein,
Medical Screening of Workers at 125 (cited in note 1).
2 Id. at 124-27.
" See, for example, Dauten v. County of Muskegon, 128 Mich. App. 435, 340 N.W.2d
117 (1983) (lifeguard at risk of back spasms); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Ohio Civil Rights,
473 N.E.2d 325 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas 1981) (coal miner with hearing impairment).
"4See State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 480 N.E.2d 695
(1985) (rejecting employer's argument that hiring obese woman would pose a significant risk
to disability and life insurance programs).
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regulating innovative forms of medical screening. 5
III. FORGING PUBLIC POLICY ON WORKPLACE MEDICAL SCREENING
A.

Controlling the Flow of Information vs.
Controlling the Decisionmaking

Before considering the possible legal regulation of medical
screening, it is important to ponder the policy issues at stake. If
medical screening is to be controlled, a key question is whether the
law should prohibit the employer from obtaining certain medical
information or merely prohibit the employer from using the information in making employment decisions related to hiring, firing,
promotions, layoffs, job assignment, and other matters.
Employment discrimination laws have used both approaches.
For example, Title VII does not specifically prohibit an employer
from inquiring into an applicant's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, although the solicitation of such information may
support an adverse inference in a subsequent discrimination suit.6
Accordingly, virtually no employers ask for this sort of information. By contrast, AIDS discrimination laws prohibit any inquiry
into an individual's serological status, not just the use of the
information."'
The experience under handicap discrimination laws is instructive on the problems of distinguishing between access to medical
information and the use of medical information. Handicap discrimination laws generally prohibit an employer from making a preemployment inquiry into whether an individual suffers from any specific medical conditions such as epilepsy, diabetes, and
hypertension. The employer, customarily a personnel department
employee, is simply permitted to ask if the individual is suffering
from any physical or mental impairment which would substantially
interfere with the individual's ability to safely and efficiently perform the duties of the job.
The individual's hiring may then be subject to successful completion of a medical examination at which time a doctor or nurse
may then lawfully ask much more detailed questions about the
same medical conditions that could not be inquired about earlier.
" For a discussion of other traditional labor and employment laws and their applicability to medical screening, see Rothstein, Medical Screening of Workers (cited in note 1).
06 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pre-Employment Inquiries (1981).
67 See, for example, Wis. Stat. Annot. sec. 103.15(2)(a), (2)(b), & 3 (West Supp. 1987).
" See 45 C.F.R. sec. 84.14 (1987).
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In addition, a complete examination and medical testing may be
required.6 9 The results of this examination will then determine employability. Any medical disqualification, however, must be job-related or it will run afoul of the handicap discrimination laws. Consequently, the prohibition against inquiring into handicaps by
nonmedical personnel only helps to prevent summary disqualification by the nonmedical personnel.
Restrictions on the use of medical information thus appear
easier to enforce than restrictions on access to medical information. Bans on access to information would seem more justified
when the inquiry is of a sensitive nature (e.g., AIDS) or where
stressful (e.g., polygraphs), embarrassing (e.g., observed urination
for drug testing), or harmful (e.g., unnecessary x-rays) procedures
are used. In other instances, mere "use" bans are likely to be sufficient protection. If an employer is unable to use certain information, it makes no sense for an employer to incur the expense of
obtaining and storing the information as well as risk possible employee relations costs and legal liability for the wrongful disclosure
of the information.
B.

Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality

More medical screening means more medical records and more
medical records increases the chances of excess disclosure of sensitive information. In large companies that have their own medical
departments, medical records usually are stored in the medical department and access is limited to medical personnel with a need to
know. Even with such an arrangement, however, nonmedical personnel sometimes gain access to the records or are informed about
specific medical facts in the records. At smaller companies, medical
information obtained by contract physicians sometimes is maintained in personnel files where neither ethical canons nor legal
strictures assure limited access.
Any attempt to regulate medical screening also should address
the issue of medical records. California's Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act is perhaps the most sweeping state law and it requires employers to take specific measures to protect the confidentiality of all employee medical records. 0 Other state laws are more
69 Id.
70

Cal. Civil Code Annot. sec. 56 to 56.37 (1982):

(a)Each employer who receives medical information shall establish appropriate
procedures to ensure the confidentiality and protection from unauthorized use and
disclosure of that information. These procedures may include, but are not limited
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limited in their applicability. For example, some recently enacted
state drug testing laws provide for the confidentiality of drug testing records."' Nebraska's 1988 drug testing law merely prohibits
"public" disclosure of test results. 2
C.

De-coupling Health Insurance from Employment

Employer-provided group health insurance became common
during World War II because such fringe benefits were not subject
to wartime wage and price controls. Thus, employees (often union
members bargaining collectively) were given health insurance coverage when increasing wages was not possible. 7 During the 1950s
and 1960s, the scope of coverage expanded from hospital care to a
wide range of medical, dental, and other benefits. Coverage was
also extended to retirees and workers' family members.
The driving force behind health insurance as an employerprovided fringe benefit was the tax-favored treatment of benefits.
Employer contributions to a group plan are deductible to the employer as a business expense and, more importantly, excluded from
the taxable income of the employee. Consequently, health insurance provides a greater after-tax gain to employees than comparable (taxable) wage payments.
During the 1970s and 1980s increasing health insurance costs
caused many companies to change from the traditional mode of
purchasing coverage from commercial insurance companies or Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plans. One of the most significant changes was
the growth of self-insurance, whereby large companies would as-

to, instruction regarding confidentiality of employees and agents handling files
containing medical information, and security systems restricting access to files
containing medical information ....
(c). . . No employer shall use, disclose, or knowingly permit its employees or
agents to use or disclose medical information which the employer possesses per-.
taining to its employees without the patient having first signed an authorization
• ..permitting such use or disclosure (except if the disclosure of the records is
compelled by legal process, the records are an issue in a pending legal action, the
information is used in administering an employee benefits plan, or the information
is used in diagnosis or treatment).
Civil Code sec. 56.20. Under the law, an individual whose records have been disclosed may
recover compensatory damages, punitive damages up to $3,000, attorneys' fees up to $1,000,
and costs of litigation. Violations are also punishable as misdemeanors. This statute is, by
far, the most sweeping protection for employee privacy.
" See, for example, 21 Vt. Stat. Annot. sec. 516 (Supp. 1987).
" Neb. Legis. Bill No. 582 (Jan. 29, 1988).
11 Office of Technology Assessment, United States Congress, Medical Testing and

Health Insurance (1988) ("OTA Report").

MEDICAL SCREENING
sume direct responsibility for paying claims. 4 Self-insurance eliminates the risk-spreading function of commercial insurance and increases the pressure to deny employment (and thereby coverage)
to bad insurance risks.
With this background, it is easy to see why concerns about
health care costs and health insurance rates are likely to be the key
factor in increased medical screening. In its traditional role, an employer is concerned about whether applicants and employees are
currently capable of performing the job and, therefore, is primarily
concerned with what takes place in the workplace. In its role as
health insurer, the employer may be concerned about the likelihood or risk of future illness and health care costs 78 and, therefore,
will be concerned about off-work activities such as smoking, drinking, diet, exercise and high-risk hobbies. Moreover, because health
insurance frequently covers family members, the employer as
health insurer also has an interest in the health and activities of a
worker's family members.
As Professors Epstein7 6 and Liebman7 7 have observed, there is
a growing tension between handicap discrimination laws, which require employers to disregard future health risks in deciding employability, and the traditional underwriting function of an insurer. For example, assuming that fifty percent of HIV positive
individuals will develop AIDS within five to ten years and that
each case of AIDS costs $80,000," each HIV positive person hired
represents an average cost of $40,000. The trend toward mandating
health insurance benefits only heightens this tension. 9 Steps must
be taken to relieve the financial burden from individual employers
and, simultaneously, to eliminate the employers' main motivation
for discriminating against individuals in high risk groups. It is unrealistic to assume that employers, especially self-insured employers that are unregulated by state insurance laws,"0 can or will ab-

Id.
Id.
71 See Richard A. Epstein, AIDS, Testing and the Workplace, 1988 U. Chi. Legal. F. 33.
77 See Lance Liebman, Too Much Information: Predictions of Employee Disease and
the Fringe Benefit System, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 57.
71 See David E. Bloom and Geoffrey Carliner, The Economic Impact of AIDS in the
United States, 239 Science 604, 606 (1988).
71 See, for example, Minimum Health Benefits for All Workers Act of 1987, S. 1265,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 21, 1987) (bill of Senator Kennedy, proposing mandatory employer-paid health insurance). In April 1988, Massachusetts became the first state to enact
guaranteed health insurance for all residents. See, Robin Toner, Health Insurance and Political Hoopla, N.Y. Times sec. Y, 8 (April 22, 1988).
o ERISA preempts state insurance laws with respect to health insurance benefits pro74

75

22

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1988:

sorb the growing costs of comprehensive health coverage and not
attempt to limit who is covered or what medical conditions are
covered.
The "simplest" solution would be to de-couple health insurance from employment. Employers would have little incentive to
engage in predictive medical screening if future health care costs
would not be borne by the employer. The specifics of such an alternative arrangement are beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it is clear that mandating employer-provided health insurance
is likely to lead to increased medical screening and employment
discrimination.
If health insurance is de-coupled from employment,
it must be
made available on a universal basis by another source. In the
United States, access to quality health care depends on access to
adequate health insurance. In 1987 there were thirty-seven million
Americans without health insurance, most of whom were not working." If the employment aspects of health insurance are not addressed, the number of uninsured individuals will grow and with
dire social consequences.
D.

Using the Workplace to Solve Larger Social Problems

Since at least the New Deal, the workplace has been used as a
vehicle for social policy. For example, in enacting the Fair Labor
Standard Act's minimum wage provision, 82 Congress sought to increase consumer spending and stimulate the economy out of the
Great Depression. But employment policies, ranging from the Davis-Bacon Act8 to wage/price controls generally were limited to economic policy. Even Title VII attempted to promote equal employment. opportunity and thereby realign income levels and living
standards skewed by race. 4
In recent years, the workplace has been used increasingly as a
way of solving larger, often noneconomic, social problems. There
are a number of examples of this phenomenon. The Immigration

vided by self-insured employers. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,
521-26 (1981). Compare, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(state requirement that group health insurance provide benefits for mental illness not
preempted).
SI OTA Report (cited in note 73).
A2 29 U.S.C. sec. 206 (1982).
83 40 U.S.C. sec. 276a to a-5 (1982).
84 H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. (Nov. 20, 1963) in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News, 2355, 2513-17.
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Reform and Control Act8 5 is premised, at least in part, on the theory that employer sanctions for hiring undocumented workers will
decrease the demand for undocumented workers and ultimately
stem the flow of illegal immigration. Public sector and private sector drug testing is an attempt to decrease the demand for illegal
drugs by making drug users unemployable. The United States is
now attempting to end delinquent child support at the plant gate,
provide child care at the plant gate, supply health insurance at the
plant gate, and encourage wellness at the plant gate. The question
is: At what cost?
It may be that, like public schools and the military, the large
numbers of people passing through the employment system make
it an ideal point to reach large numbers of people. Nevertheless,
the long-term economic effects must be considered. For example, a
government mandate that each employer provide child care is tantamount to a child care tax placed on every covered employer. It is
politically attractive because it is an off-budget expenditure. Yet, it
further encourages companies to go abroad for their labor-intensive operations.
Interposing governmental functions in the workplace also may
exact noneconomic social costs. Random, house-to-house drug testing would, undoubtedly, be an effective law enforcement technique. It also should be unconstitutional. Regardless of the legality, law enforcement via drug testing in the workplace is a policy
with questionable effectiveness for reducing drug abuse but one
that is certain to engender labor-management strife.
Medical screening highlights the fact that the proper scope of
employer interest would be limited to the workplace. When employers extend their sphere of concerns too far they court trouble
for themselves, their employees and society.
IV.

WHAT MEDICAL SCREENING INDICATES

ABOUT THE STATE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW

Medical screening practices are generally not regulated by any
specific laws and, to the extent there is some legal control, it is
often indirect. Medical screening is also a relatively new phenomenon and one that is likely to be affected by changes in technology.
These two factors make the broader study of medical screening
particularly revealing because the response to medical screening
indicates much about the current state of employment law. The
8' Pub. L. 99-603, 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5649, 100 Stat. 3359.
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following are five general observations about employment law suggested by and brought into sharper focus by their application to
medical screening.
A.

Disparities in the Rights of Public Sector
and Private Sector Employees

According to the court in a recent drug testing case, government employees "do not surrender their [Flourth [A]mendment
rights merely because they go to work for the government. ' 86 In
fact, relative to private employees, public employees gain their
constitutional rights by working for the government. Search and
seizure, invasion of privacy, due process, equal protection, First
Amendment, and other bases for challenging employer action are
constitutionally based and therefore are limited to public employees (and private employees whose alleged denial of rights, such as
by medical screening, has been governmentally mandated).
The two questions raised by this disparity are whether these
constitutional protections should be extended to all private sector
employees and, if so, how. To some extent, debate surrounding the
first questions parallels the debate over expanding the exceptions
to the at-will employment rule. Those in favor of maintaining the
at-will rule argue that it is efficient and works well for employers
and employees in the vast majority of instances.87 Those opposed
to the at-will rule assert the inequality in bargaining power between employer and employee and the potential for unfairness in
arbitrary employer powers.8 8 Even assuming the efficacy of extending "constitutional-type" protections to all private sector employees, it is not clear what the extent of these protections should
be. Should all unreasonable employer actions be prohibited or only
those of a "constitutional" dimension? Who should have the burden of proof? Should the same rights applied to discharge cases
also apply to promotions, layoffs, hiring, and conditions of
employment?
The second question, regarding the possible legal theories
under which greater employee rights are recognized, also raises nu-

" Allen

v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
" See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 947 (1984).
"BSee, for example, Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404 (1967); Clyde
W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L.
Rev. 481 (1976).
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merous issues. In some states, state constitutional protections apply without the need to prove governmental action. 9 These provisions have been invoked, for example, to attack private sector drug
testing which is allegedly an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.9 0
Specific state statutes regulating drug testing and AIDS testing or
prohibiting wrongful discharge are other possibilities. Still another
approach is to attempt to extend constitutional protections to private sector employees through the public policy exception to the
at-will doctrine.
In Schultz v. Industrial Coils, Inc.,91 an employee wrote a letter to the editor of the local newspaper. In commenting about the
local schools, the employee attacked the president of the school
board-who happened to be an officer of the company where the
employee worked. After being discharged for insubordination, the
employee brought a wrongful discharge action under the public
policy exception to the at-will doctrine. He claimed that the employer's action denied him freedom of expression as protected by
the Wisconsin Constitution and thus was a violation of public
policy.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that although free
speech may support a wrongful discharge action under the public
policy exception, the employer had a legitimate basis for discharging the employee. Relying on Connick v. Meyers, 2 the court stated
that an employer need not tolerate actions which undermine authority or discipline or are otherwise disruptive of office routine or
employee relations. Schultz at least raises the possibility of extending constitutional protections to private sector employees via
the public policy exception.
In Schultz, the constitutional issues involved the First
Amendment. With medical screening, the constitutional issues are
likely to be related to search and seizure, invasion of privacy, equal
protection, and other doctrines. It is not clear whether the courts
will be willing to extend these other constitutional principles to the
private sector via the public policy exception.
"' Ariz. Const. art. II, sec. 8; Cal. Const. art. I, sec. 1, 13; Haw. Const. art. I, sec. 5-7; I1.
Const. art. I, sec. 6; La. Const. art. I, sec. 5; Mo. Const. art I, sec. 2, 15; Wash. Const. art. I,

sec. 7.
90 See Price v. Pacific Ref. Co., No. 292000 (Contra Costa Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 1987),
reported in Bureau of National Affairs, 5 Employee Rel. Weekly 264 (1987). See generally
Note, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in California?, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1451 (1986).
" 125 Wis.2d 520, 373 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1985).
" 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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The Limited Rights of Applicants

At common law, an employer had virtually unfettered control
in selecting its employees. The employer could hire or refuse to
hire any person for any reason or no reason at all."3 This right included the right to refuse to hire an individual because of the employer's opinion that the prospective employee was physically incapable of performing the job."' In determining the medical
condition of applicants, employers were free to make submission to
medical examinations and tests a valid condition of employment.
An applicant could refuse the test, but the employer would then
simply not hire the individual.
With few exceptions, this is still the law today. Referring to
the drug testing of applicants and employees, one management
lawyer recently stated: "In the nonpublic sector, employers have
the right to do whatever they damn please-and they are going to
do it."9 5
Even the enactment of an occasional statute has not had much
effect on medical screening practices. Maryland enacted a law in
1976 prohibiting employers from requiring applicants to answer
any questions about medical conditions which do not bear a direct
relationship to the applicant's fitness to perform the specific job
under consideration. 6 Nevertheless, the law "does not prohibit a
proper medical evaluation by a physician for the purpose of assessing an applicant's ability to perform a job."9 Thus, company physicians may still require detailed medical examinations as a condition of employment.
Traditional labor and employment laws are unlikely to be of
much benefit to applicants, either. The National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), 9 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"' the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 0 0 and the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973101 all apply to applicants. As a practical matter, however,
applicants have fewer rights than employees. For example, appli-

" See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-75 (1908).

, See Dillon v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 43 Md. App 161, 403 A.2d 406, 40708 (1979).
95 Drug Testing Upheld, Decried: Physicians Asked to Help Decide, 259 J. A.M.A. 2341
(1988) (quoting G. Harrison Darby).
" Md. Annot. Code art. 100, sec. 95A(a) (Michie 1985).
17 Id. at sec. 95A(b).
" 29 U.S.C. sec. 151-69 (1982).
42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e (1982).
29 U.S.C. sec. 621-34 (1982).
29 U.S.C. sec. 701-96 (1982).
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cants are considered "employees" under the NLRA and the terms
of their hiring are subject to collective bargaining.0 2 Yet, unions
rarely bargain over applicant rights because applicants are not yet
members of the bargaining unit and they are often not yet union
members. Consequently, unions use their limited economic leverage to secure favorable conditions for current employees.
Applicants are also less likely to sue under any statute or legal
theory than are current employees. For one thing, both the applicants and the courts tend to view their loss in not being hired to be
less substantial than the denial of benefits or termination of an
employee with years of service.1"3 In addition, unlike most employees who are discharged, most applicants who are not hired are
never informed of the company's reasons. Without knowing the
reason in advance, an applicant is unlikely to initiate a lawsuit and
the discovery process during which this information may be
obtained.
The limited rights of applicants can be seen in preemployment
medical screening. As noted earlier, applicants are often required
to complete detailed medical questionnaires and to undergo medical examination and laboratory tests. If the applicant refuses to
cooperate he or she is unlikely to be hired. Applicants will be
asked to consent to invasive procedures, such as blood tests, but
the applicants are rarely told what tests will be run or what the
results of the tests are. Applicants usually are not told why they
are not hired or given the chance to explain a questionable medical
finding. Although, in theory, similar measures may be used with
current employees, most employers realize that such insensitivity-at least as to current employees-is counterproductive.
C. The Narrow Scope of the Exceptions to the At-Will Rule
During the last fifteen years almost every jurisdiction has recognized one or more exceptions to the at-will rule. Some highly
publicized cases, including some large recoveries, and a flood of law
review articles, conferences, and debates have contributed to the
impression that the at-will rule has undergone a major transformation. 0 Although these developments are certainly significant, the
'0 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Mount Desert
Island Hosp., 695 F.2d 634, 638 (1st Cir. 1982).
oI See, for example, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App.3d 311, 329, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (1981) (long-term employees may develop contractual rights to retain their jobs
absent just cause for their discharge).
104 See, for example, William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years
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changes have been more evolutionary than revolutionary.
Three main exceptions have been recognized. First, provisions
in employee handbooks and manuals have been held to create implied contract rights in favor of the employees.105 Many handbooks
and manuals contained statements that employees would not be
fired without just cause. After several cases bound employers to
these promises, many employers purged their handbooks and
manuals of all language that could be construed as a promise of job
security.
Second, most jurisdictions have recognized the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.10 6 The availability of
large awards for compensatory and punitive damages has focused
attention on these tort actions, but public policy is not open-ended. The suit generally must be based on a clearly expressed policy, such as that embodied in a state statute, and is usually restricted to four main categories: Refusing to commit unlawful acts
(e.g., perjury, falsification of public records); exercising statutory
rights (e.g., filing a workers' compensation claim); performing public functions (e.g., serving on jury duty); and reporting an employer's unlawful conduct (e.g., whistleblowing).
Third, a few jurisdictions have held that every employment
contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of which is actionable in contract or even tort.107 Although this exception represents the application to employment
law of a traditional contract doctrine,10 8 it has been adopted by
only a few courts. Moreover, its use in specific cases is often difficult. Good faith is subjective and therefore the absence of good
faith may be difficult to prove except in the most compelling factual situations.10 9
Employee challenges to employer medical screening practices

of Employer Privilege, 21 Idaho L. Rev. 201 (1985), and Gary E. Murg & Clifford Sharman,
Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 329 (1982).
...See, for example, Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983);
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985).
"00See, for example, Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973).
107 See, for example, Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1257 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 315 A.2d 549 (1974).
'08 See American Law Institute, 2 Restatement of the Law (Second) Contracts sec. 205
(1981).
'o See, for example, McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass.
1980) (employee forced to retire under duress); Monge, 114 N.H. at 130 (cited in note 107)
(employee discharged for refusing to date her supervisor).
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brought under common law theories are rare and not often successful. The at-will exceptions only apply to discharges and even in
discharge cases the use of medical criteria to determine termination, even if ill-advised, is rarely considered wrongful. 110 For example, in Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., the employer
discharged a diabetic employee on the basis of a negative medical
report. Although the employer's conduct arguably violated Pennsylvania's Human Relations Act," 2 the court refused to permit a
common law action for wrongful discharge."'
D. The Limited Economic Power of Unions
Drug testing of applicants and employees is the most controversial of the current medical screening practices. It is interesting
to note the response of organized labor to this phenomenon. Most
unions have concluded that under some circumstances, such as in
certain safety-sensitive jobs, limited drug testing is acceptable." '
Where drug testing is viewed as unacceptable, however, unions
have not responded with strikes and aggressive collective bargaining; they have responded with litigation and lobbying for
legislation.
In fairness, some of the unions affected by drug testing represent public employees who are prohibited from striking. Nevertheless, many of the recent gains in working conditions realized by
workers have been achieved through the political process rather
than by the use of economic power. OSHA, ERISA, and various
antidiscrimination laws have been enacted in large measure because of union support. It is an open question, however, whether
the legislation will undermine unionization in the long run. With
more employment rights, such as pensions and safety, protected by
these laws there may be less need for unions. Thus, unions, already
declining in members, may be further contributing to their own
demise. What would be the effect on union organizing if health insurance benefits were statutorily mandated and discharge without
"' See, for example, Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Wyo. 1987) (drug
testing); Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985)
(drug testing).
"'
692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982).
12 43 Pa. Stat. Annot. sec 951-63 (Purdon 1964). The act prohibits discrimination on
the basis of handicap. 43 Pa. Stat. Annot. sec. 953 (Purdon 1987).
"' As a federal court in a diversity case, the Third Circuit was reluctant to expand
Pennsylvania law. Brufjett, 692 F.2d at 918.
'1 See James Ellenberger, AFL-CIO Urges Privacy Protection Treatment in Drug
Abuse Testing, Bus. & Health 58 (Oct. 1987).
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just cause was illegal and redressable through the courts or some
administrative body?
E.

The Growing Importance of State and Local Laws

The cities and states have replaced the federal government in
the forefront of legislative protection of employees. This is certainly true in the area of medical screening. Four states ban genetic testing,"8 ten states restrict AIDS tests, " 6 nine states limit
drug tests and" 7 twenty three states prohibit polygraphs." 8 It is
true in other areas as well. While Congress has refused to act, some
cities and states have, for example, prohibited marital status and
sexual orientation discrimination, regulated smoking in the workplace, and extended collective bargaining rights to farmworkers.
The decentralization of employment law raises various legal issues, foremost of which is preemption. In some instances the state
law will be in direct conflict with a federal law or regulation. For
example, in French v. Pan American Express Inc.," 9 an airline pi"I Fla. Stat. Annot. sec. 448.075 (West 1981) (sickle cell); La. Rev. Stat. Annot.
sec. 23:1001-04 (West 1985) (sickle cell); N.J. Stat. Annot. sec. 10:5-5 (y)-(cc) (West Supp.
1987) (sickle cell, hemoglobin C, thalassemia, Tay-Sachs, cystic fibrosis); N.C. Gen. Stat.
sec. 95-28.1 (Michie 1987) (sickle cell and hemoglobin C).
1'
Cal. Health & Safety Code sec. 199.21(f) & 199.38 (West Supp. 1988); Delaware HB
136 (1988); Fla. Stat. Annot. sec. 381.606(5) (1985); Iowa HF-2344 (1988); Mass. Annot.
Laws sec. 70E (Lawyer's Co-Operative Supp. 1988); RI Pub. L. 88-405 (1988); Tex. Civil
Stat. Annot. art. 4419b-1.5 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Vt H239 (1988); Wash chap. 206 (1988);
Wis. Stat. Annot. sec. 103.15(2)(a), (2)(b), (3) (West Supp. 1987). A number of cities, including Los Angeles, Los Angeles Code art. 5.8 sec. 45.80-45.93 (1987), and San Francisco, San
Francisco Police Code sec. 3801-3816 (1985), also prohibit the use of AIDS testing in
employment.
..
7 Conn. Pub. Act No. 87-551 (West Appen. Pamph. 1987); Iowa Stat. Annot. sec. 730.5
(West Supp. 1987); Kansas HB 1618 (1988); Minn. Stat. Annot. sec. 181.950-57 (West Supp.
1988); 39 Mont. Code Annot. sec. 2-304 (1987); Nebraska Legis. Bill #582 (1988); R.I. Gen.
Laws sec. 28-6.5-1 to -2 (1987); Utah Code Annot. sec. 34-38-1 to -15 (Michie 1987); 21 Vt.
Stat. Annot. sec. 511-520 (Equity 1987).
"' 23 Alaska Stat. sec. 10.037 (Michie 1987); Cal. Labor Code sec. 432.2 (Deering Supp.
1988); Conn. Gen. stat. Annot. sec. 31-51g (West 1987); 19 Del. Code Annot. sec. 704
(Mitchie 1985); Haw. Rev. Stat. sec. 378-2 through 29.3 (1976); Idaho Code sec. 44-903-04
(Bobbs-Merrill 1977); Iowa Code Annot. sec. 730.4 (West Supp. 1988); 32 Me. Rev. Stat.
Annot. sec. 71666 (West 1986); 100 Md. Code Annot. sec. 95 (Michie Supp. 1987); 149 Mass.
Annot. Laws sec. 19B (Lawyer's Co-Operative Supp. 1987); Mich. Compiled Laws Annot.
sec. 37.201-.209 (1985); Minn. Stat. Annot. sec. 181.75 (West Supp. 1988); 39 Mont. Code
Annot. sec. 2-304 (1987); 2C N.J. Stat. Annot. sec. 40A-1 (West 1982); 20B N.Y. Consol.
Laws Annot. sec. 733-39 (McKinney Supp. 1988); Or. Rev. Stat. sec. 659.225 and .227 (1987);
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Annot. sec. 7321 (Purdon 1983); 28 R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 6.1-1 to -2 (1986);
49 Wash. Rev. Code Annot. sec. 44.120-.135 (West Supp. 1988); 21 Vt. Stat. Annot. sec. 494494e (Equity 1987); 21 W. Va. Code sec. 5-5a to -5d (Michie 1985).
"' No. 87-517 (D.R.I. filed Oct. 10, 1987), cited in 1 National Rep. on Substance Abuse
(BNA) 8 (Oct. 14, 1987).
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lot was fired after he refused to take a drug test following a tip
that the pilot was seen smoking marijuana while off duty. The pilot brought an action in state court under Rhode Island's 1987
drug testing law, which prohibits drug testing unless there is reasonable cause to believe the employee's performance is impaired.12 0
The case was removed to federal court. The district court will have
to decide whether Federal Aviation Administration regulations,
which mandate drug testing, preempt the Rhode Island statute.
In other instances the federal and state policies will be in
agreement, but the preemption issue will center on what is the
proper forum. For example, in the last several years, state and local prosecutors have begun to bring criminal prosecutions for criminal negligence, manslaughter, and even murder against various
company officials after especially egregious workplace safety and
health hazards caused injury or death to workers. Much of this activity is the result of a perceived laxity in federal OSHA enforcement. The courts have reached divergent results on the issue of
whether a state criminal prosecution based on conditions in the
workplace is preempted by the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act. 2 '
With a strong likelihood of new state laws regulating medical
screening, preemption is merely one of the potential legal issues.
Other problems that may arise include the res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect of a prior adjudication in another forum; exhaustion
of remedies, and questions of statutory construction, such as
whether an employee may be discharged in state A on the basis of
a medical test performed in state B that is only illegal in state A.
V.

CONCLUSION

Medical screening is more extensive and intensive than at any
time in the past. Scientific advances, increased health care costs,
and other factors also point to an increase in medical screening.
This growth is not an altogether positive development. While medical screening may serve as a mechanism for illness detection, lifestyle modification, and proper job assignment, it has several drawbacks. Many tests commonly used are not as accurate as widely
believed; the tests sometimes invade worker privacy and generate
records that may be wrongfully disclosed, and numerous currently
28 R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 6.5-1 to -2 (1987).
,' Compare People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 157 Il. App.3d 797, 510 N.E.2d
120

1173 (1987) (state criminal prosecution preempted), with People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51
N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660 (1980) (state criminal prosecution not preempted).
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healthy workers are rendered unemployable because of future risk
of illness.
Employment laws related to medical screening have fostered
inconsistent policies. Some laws, including workers' compensation
and ERISA, encourage preemployment medical screening. Other
specific statutes (e.g., AIDS testing) and handicap discrimination
laws prohibit some forms of medical screening. This piecemeal legislative approach, however, dealing with working conditions, benefits, and discrimination separately, is unlikely to be effective in formulating medical screening policy. Such an approach is especially
doubtful if it does not deal with the issue of the employer's role in
health insurance. The combination of new technology and health
care cost containment pressures may give rise to heretofore
unimaginable levels of workplace medical screening. The magnitude of the consequences of this widespread screening to employment relations, health insurance, health care, the welfare system,
the economy, and civil rights demands that the issues of medical
screening be moved to the forefront of public debate.
Medical screening also provides a graphic illustration of the
intricacies and shortcomings of modern employment law. From a
laissez faire background, legislatures and courts have carved out a
series of undecipherable, inconsistent, and compartmentalized limitations on employer prerogatives. Certainly, as applied to medical
screening, the various laws are often operating at cross-purposes
and seemingly treat like employees quite differently based on dubious criteria. The resulting morass raises fundamental questions
about the efficiency and fairness of our system of employment
laws.

